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CONFLICT OF LAWS: PROPERTY ACQUIRED AFTER
MARRIAGE
The Restatement's Approach
The Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws treats the conflict of
laws as a branch of state law.' The general rule, according to the
Restatement, is that the forum court will apply the statutory direc-
tives of its own state in the choice of law, and, if none exist, the court
will then consider all of the factors before it in determining the law
to be applied.2 To the extent that the law in this area is decisional,
it is open to reexamination and change just as any other area of
nonstatutory law.'
The Restatement distinguishes between immovables and mova-
bles in the conflict rules applicable to property acquired after mar-
riage. The general rule as to immovables is that the law which would
be applied by the court of the situs of the immovable determines the
effect of marriage upon the interests in it.' Two reasons are advanced
for applying this rule to immovables: the need for certainty of legal
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1969) "Conflict of Laws is that
part of the law of each state which determines what effect is given to the fact that the
case may have a significant relationship to more than one state." However, several
commentators have argued that the area of conflict of laws is a federal rather than a
state subject. "It is a subject completely under the authority of Congress by reason of
the express provisions of full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, and in default
of Congressional action, arguably, subject to final determination by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The U.S. Supreme Court has admitted this tacitly every time it has rendered
a decision on the full faith and credit to be given laws or judgments, for the necessity
of giving full faith and credit implies the necessity of criteria for legislative and judicial
competence. Were the matter one of state rather than federal competence, the U.S.
Supreme Court could have no right to render any decision on the subject." The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Conflict of Laws, 33 LA.
L. REV. 276, 278 (1973); see also A. VON MEHREN & D. FRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTI-
STATE PROBLEMS (1965).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969): "1. A court, subject to
constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice
of law. 2. When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
these states in determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in determination and application of the law to be applied."
3. Id. § 5.
4. Id. § 234.
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title and the fact that only officials of the situs state have the power
to deal directly with the land.'
As between the spouses themselves, the court of the situs usually
will apply what commonly has been called the "source doctrine":
that immovables assume the same nature as the funds or assets used
to acquire them.' Thus, if a husband purchases an immovable in a
separate property state with community assets, it most often will be
held that the wife has the same interest in the immovable as she had
in the funds used for its acquisition. However, the courts are hesitant
to apply the "source doctrine" when the rights of third persons are
involved.7 For example, if a creditor relies upon the laws of the situs
state' to protect his interests in the land, the situs state will recognize
his rights without regard to the "source doctrine."'
5. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 298, 299 (1971).
6. Rau v. Rau, 6 Ariz. App. 362, 432 P.2d 910 (1968); Tomair v. Tomair, 23 Cal.
2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944); Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 202 (1848); McDowell v. Harris,
107 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); In re Pugh's Estate, 18 Wash. 2d 501, 139 P.2d
698 (1943).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 234, comment (a) (1969).
8. The authority of the situs state to act with respect to immovables within its
boundaries is a well settled principle of law. Although there is no question that a situs
state can render a valid judgment as to immovables located therein, difficulty arises
when a non-situs court renders a judgment which purports to affect immovables in a
foreign state. An early line of cases held that a non-situs court could render a judgment
which would affect property outside the state if it had personal jurisdiction over the
parties. Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. '(9 Wall.) 108 (1869); Watts v. Waddle, 31 U.S. (6
Peters) 389 (1832); Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810). These decisions
were all couched in terms of in personam judgments directing the parties to act rather
than directly affecting the title of the property in the foreign state. In Carpenter v.
Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891), the United States Supreme Court upheld a state court's
refusal to enforce a sister state's judgment which attempted to declare a deed of
Tennessee land void. Although the Supreme Court upheld Tennessee's refusal to en-
force the judgment, it indicated that it would have enforced the judgment had it been
phrased as an in personam judgment rather than as an in rem judgment.
The approach taken by the various states is not uniform. A majority of the states,
including Louisiana, following the reasoning in Strange, holding that the foreign judg-
ment is not entitled to full faith and credit because the court lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Putnam & Norman v. Conner, 144 La. 231, 80 So. 265 (1918);
Wayne v. Reynolds, 125 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960); Butler v. Bolenger, 133
So. 778 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931); but see Yawn v. Lamb, 276 So. 2d 872 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Conflict of Laws, 34 LA. L. REV. 319, 325 (1974). A minority of states have
enforced judgments by the non-situs courts for divergent reasons, including estoppel,
comity, and full faith and credit. Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682
(1959); Fire Assn. v. Patton, 15 N.M. 304, 107 P. 679 (1910); McRary v. McRary, 228
N.C. 714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948); McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722
(1961); Bailey v. Tully, 242 Wis. 226, 7 N.W.2d 837 (1943); Mallette v. Scheerer, 164
Wis. 415, 160 N.W. 182 (1916).
9. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 337 (1971).
COMMENTS
In recognition of the fact that movables can easily be taken from
one state to another, the Restatement takes the approach that the
spouses' interests in movables usually are governed by the law of their
domicile at the time of acquisition,"° unless there is an effective choice
of law by the spouses." The advantage of this rule, as opposed to the
situs rule, is that it allows the domiciliary state to apply one set of
laws to movables located in different states. Furthermore, if the par-
ties move from one state to another, the law of the second state is
applicable to acquisitions made while the parties are domiciled there,
while the law of the first state is applicable to the movables the
parties acquired while domiciled in that state. Thus, one must con-
sider not only the domicile of the parties but also the time of acquisi-
tion. If one of the spouses takes a movable from one state to another,
the spouses' respective interests are preserved, 2 even if the movable
is exchanged for other movables or immovables. For example, if a
husband from a community property state takes community funds to
a separate property state and purchases a car, the wife would have
an interest in the property similar to her former interest. 3
The Restatement's handling of this type of situation seems to be
equitable, but certain difficulties may arise. Suppose husband (H)
and wife (W), domiciled in a separate property state which gives a
wife a right in the husband's separate property at his death, move to
a community property state just before H dies. If H dies intestate,
the laws of the domiciliary state would govern the distribution of the
movables," and inasmuch as all of H's movables would be separate
property, they would be distributed according to the community
property state's law of succession relating to separate property. 5 This
result would defeat the purpose of both the survivorship laws of the
separate property state and the community property provisions of the
other. 16
An equally unfair result would take place if H and W moved from
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 258 (1969).
11. For example, if the spouses entered into an antenuptial contract, a contract
after marriage, or a contract designating their respective interests in a particular object
(if sanctioned by the state law) the Restatement recognizes any of these as an effective
choice of law.
12. Id. § 259.
13. Id. § 259, comment (b) (1969).
14. In re O'Connor's Estate, 218 Cal. 518, 23 P.2d 1031 (1933); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 260 (1969).
15. If the laws of the community property state make no provision for the wife
with respect to H's separate property, all of H's property would go to his descendants
or next of kin, leaving the wife with nothing.
16. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW § 236 at 568 (1959).
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a community property state to a separate property state. H and W
would continue to have their respective interests in the movables, but
upon the death of one of the spouses the survivor would have a survi-
vor's right to the decedent's property. This would give the surviving
spouse a greater interest in the movables than was contemplated by
either the community property laws or by the survivorship provisions
of the separate property laws."7
The rights of third parties such as creditors and transferees will
be recognized when the property has been taken from one jurisdiction
to another. The court will usually apply the law "that would be
applied by the courts of the state where the chattel or document was
located at the time the interest is claimed to have been acquired."' 8
For example, if H brings a movable from a community property state
into a separate property state, and a creditor acquires an interest in
it there, the courts will usually enforce the creditor's interest without
regard to W's community interest in the movable.
Louisiana Legislation
The first law in Louisiana dealing with property acquired after
marriage was the Spanish law contained in the Fuero Real:
Everything which the husband and wife acquire while together,
shall be equally divided between them.'9
and in the Las Siete Partidas:
'And we say, that the agreement they had made before or at the
time of their marriage, ought to have its effect in the manner they
may have stipulated, and that it will not be avoided by the cus-
tom of the place to which they have removed. And so we say it
would be, if they had not entered into any agreement; for the
custom of the country where they contracted the marriage, ought
to have its effect as it regards the dowry, the arras, and the gains
they may have made: and not that of the place to which they have
removed."'
Article 63 of the Digest of 1808 (Revised Civil Code article 2399)
further provided that, absent an antenuptial agreement, every mar-
riage contracted within the territory superinduced of right the com-
munity of gains. This Digest provision was completely consistent
17. Id.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 259, comment (c) (1969).
19. Novisima Recopilacion bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 1 (1805).
20. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS bk. 1, tit. 11, L. 23 (Lislet & Carleton transl. 1820).
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with the Partidas' conflicts rule, and both provisions were in effect
until 1828.
Article 2370 of the 1825 Civil Code (Revised Civil Code article
2401) provided that the laws of the community also apply to parties
married out of the state, who afterwards come here to reside and then
acquire property. In 1852 the legislature passed an act (Revised Civil
Code article 2400) which provides for the application of Louisiana's
laws of the community to things acquired in Louisiana by a married
non-resident.
There is an apparent conflict between the last two cited articles.
The former article seems to imply that no community exists until
both spouses come to Louisiana to live, while the latter article has
no such restriction. Both of these provisions were included in the Civil
Code of 1870, the redactors apparently not noting their inconsistency.
Louisiana Jurisprudence
The principle decision in American matrimonial regime conflicts
law is Saul v. His Creditors,2 decided by the Louisiana supreme court
in 1827. Saul and his wife were married in Virginia in 1794 and were
domiciled there until 1804. They then moved to Louisiana where they
acquired a large amount of property. Subsequent to the wife's death
in 1819, the children of the marriage claimed one-half of the property
as their portion of the community of gains, but Saul's creditors al-
leged that no community existed inasmuch as the marriage had been
contracted in Virginia where no community property laws existed.
Since the assets in question had been acquired between 1804 and
1819, the Digest of 1808 and the Spanish law governed. Finding the
Digest of 1808 inapplicable to the facts, the court examined the Fuero
Real, the Partidas, and the Spanish jurisprudence, concluding that
under the Spanish jurisprudence, although contrary to the Partidas,
a community existed between Saul and his wife from the time they
moved to Louisiana. Although the decision was contrary to the legis-
lation at that time, it would have been correct had article 2370 of the
1825 Code been the governing law.
In 1828, in Cole's Widow v. His Executors," the Louisiana su-
preme court was called upon to decide whether the laws of the com-
munity of gains applied to things acquired in Louisiana by a husband
domiciled here, even though his wife never came to the state to live.
The court expanded upon its holding in Saul by stating that not only
did a community exist between a husband and wife from the time
21. 5 Mart.(N.S.) 569 (La. 1827).
22. 7 Mart.(N.S.) 41 (La. 1828).
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that both moved to the state, but it existed as to all assets acquired
in the state and found within its borders on dissolution of the regime
no matter where the spouses had resided.
In 1828 the legislature repealed all of the old Spanish laws. 3
Thus, there was no longer any basis to hold that a community existed
where only one spouse had come to Louisiana to live. The court took
cognizance of this in Dixon v. Dixon's Executors.24 In that case the
husband and wife were married in Pennsylvania in 1813, and the
husband moved to Louisiana in 1816 and lived here until his death
in 1831. The court noted that the husband died after the passage of
the 1828 Act, but held that the rights of the wife were governed by
the laws in force at the creation of the community rather than at the
time of its dissolution, and that the Spanish law had not been re-
pealed at the time the community had been created. In coming to this
conclusion the court pointed out that, if the wife's rights had arisen
after the 1828 Act, there would have been no provision in the law for
the application of the laws of the community of gains to the assets
acquired in Louisiana.
The Dixon case and a series of subsequent cases 5 were the impe-
tus for the enactment of article 2400 of the Revised Civil Code." This
statute seemed to restore the law to what had been the construction
of the Spanish laws in Saul and Cole. Therefore, in 1923 the Louis-
23. La. Acts 1828, No. 83 § 25.
24. 4 La. 188 (1832).
25. In Cooper v. Cotton, 6 La. Ann. 256 (1851), and Succession of McGill, 6 La.
Ann. 327 (1851), the parties had married out of state, and were also domiciled out of
the state. Both of these cases held that no community existed as to property acquired
by one of the spouses in Louisiana. The court recognized that this was opposite the
result reached in Cole, but noted that the Spanish law relied upon in Cole had been
repealed at the time the assets had been acquired. The court also held that articles
2369 and 2370 of the 1825 Code (articles 2399 and 2401 of the Revised Civil Code of
1870) did not apply because the parties had not contracted the marriage in the state
or moved to the state as required by these articles.
In Huff v. Borland, 6 La. Ann. 436 (1851), the husband acquired property in the
state before moving here with his wife. The court held that a community did not exist
as to property acquired by the husband before he and his wife moved here because
article 2370 of the 1825 Code (article 2401 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870) only
provides that a community exists as to property acquired after the arrival of both
husband and wife if the marriage is contracted out of state. It seems that in 1851 if a
marriage was contracted out of the state by non-domiciliaries, the community existed
only as to property acquired after both moved to the state.
26. La. Acts 1852, No. 292: "All property hereinafter acquired in this state, by
non-resident married persons, whether the title thereto be in the name of either the
husband or wife, or in their joint names, shall be subject to the same provisions of law




iana supreme court in Succession of Dill7 held that a community
existed between husband and wife as to all property acquired in the
state whether either or both of them ever came to reside in the state."
Comparison of Louisiana Law with the Restatement
As to movable property there is a conflict between the law of
other states and that of Louisiana. The general rule that is followed
in other, jurisdictions is that the law of the domicile at the time of
acquisition will determine the spouses' respective interests in a mova-
ble. According to the Louisiana rule, as overbroadly expressed in
Succession of Dill, a community exists as to all property that the
spouses acquire in Louisiana whether or not either spouse has ever
come here to live. A direct conflict exists under these two rationales.
For example, if H acquired movable property in Louisiana while he
was domiciled in state X, Louisiana would assert that a community
existed as to the property in Louisiana. On the other hand, state X
would assert that, under its conflict rules, the law of the domicile at
the time of acquisition would be applicable and therefore X's laws
should govern ownership of the movables.
The conflict became apparent in Crichton v. Succession of
Crichton.2 In that case the husband, born in Louisiana, subsequently
moved to New York and married there. At the time of his death he
owned movable property in Louisiana. The New York court rendered
a judgment pursuant to its law because the movable property was
acquired while the decedent was domiciled in New York.3" The dece-
dent's children then sought recognition of the New York judgment in
Louisiana.3 ' Although the Louisiana court of appeal gave the judg-
ment full faith and credit, it noted that the effect of the New York
judgment was contrary to Civil Code article 2400 as construed by Dill,
in that a community would have existed as to the movable property
situated in Louisiana.
The conflict that arises in this decision is due to the construction
given to article 2400 in Succession of Dill. In Dill the court categori-
cally stated that a community exists as to all property acquired in
Louisiana; however, article 2400 states only that the property "shall
be subject to the same provisions of law which regulate the com-
munity of acquets and gains between the citizens of the State."
27. 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752 (1923).
28. Id. at 57, 98 So. at 755.
29. 232 So. 2d 109 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
30. In re Estate of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811, 228 N.E.2d 799
(1967).
31. 232 So. 2d 109 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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Therefore, in determining whether a community exists as to the prop-
erty in question, it is necessary to look to the law which regulates the
community.
Prior to 1912, article 2334 provided that common property con-
sisted of all property that either party acquired during the marriage
unless acquired by "inheritance or by donation made to him or her
particularly." In 1912 article 2334 was amended to provide that sepa-
rate property also consists of property "acquired during the marriage
with separate funds." When article 2400 is read with the amended
portion of article 2334, it is easy to reach a different result from that
of Dill, and to reconcile the conflict that arose in Crichton. In a
separate property state, all of the funds the husband acquires during
marriage are his separate property. Because these funds are the sepa-
rate property of the husband, under article 2334 the property he
acquires in Louisiana should remain his separate property. If the
court had followed this line of reasoning in Dill, there would have
been no conflict between Louisiana's law and New York's law in
Crichton in that, under both laws, the property would have been the
decedent's separate property and not subject to Louisiana's com-
munity of gains.
As to immovable property, Louisiana is in accord with the law
of other states in that the law of the situs governs the interests of the
spouses. However, a conflict does exist as to the application of the
"source doctrine"' 2 which is accepted in other jurisdictions. Louisiana
does not apply the "source doctrine" because of the erroneous con-
struction given article 2400 in Dill33 and because of a jurisprudential
rule requiring a "double declaration" as established in Sharp v.
Zeller.4 This rule requires that when a husband intends to purchase
an immovable for his separate account, he must state in the act of
sale that he is purchasing with separate funds and for his separate
account. If this declaration is not present, the immovable which the
husband acquires becomes community property. This rule is juris-
prudential and has no basis in legislation. 5 Sharp, moreover, was
decided before article 2334 was amended and should rightly have no
32. See text at note 6 supra.
33. The holding in Dill that "all property acquired in this state by married persons
becomes community property regardless of where both or either of them reside" pre-
cludes inquiry into the source of the funds used to acquire the immovable. However,
if the courts would construe article 2400 in light of amended article 2334 the "source
doctrine" could be applied.
34. 110 La. 61, 34 So. 129 (1902).
35. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term- Matri-
monial Regimes, 30 LA. L. REv. 219, 224 (1969).
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application after the 1912 amendment in that the legislation only
requires that separate funds be used to acquire separate property.
Thus, in determining the rights of non-residents in property
(whether movable or immovable) under article 2400, the courts
should take into consideration the amended portion of article 2334
which allows property acquired during marriage with separate funds
to remain separate property."6
George H. Mills, Jr.
36. Id. See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Conflict of Laws, 31 LA. L. REV. 312, 320 (1971).
